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FINANCE, CONTROL, AND PROFITABILITY: THE 




Bank intermediated finance has been cited frequently as the preferred means for channeling 
funds from savers to firms.  Germany is the prototypical economy where universal banks 
allegedly exert substantial influence over firms.  Despite frequent assertions about the 
considerable power of German banks and the advantages of a bank relation, empirical support 
is mixed.  With a unique dataset and a focus on the fragility/sturdiness of inferences, this 
paper evaluates German bank influence in terms of three hypotheses: 1) do bank influenced 
firms enjoy lower finance costs? [No]; 2) is bank influence a solution to control problems? 
[Yes]; 3) do bank influenced firms have higher profitability? [No].  Coupled with results 
about the control consequences of concentrated ownership, these results suggest that bank 
influence serves as a substitute control mechanism, one of several available for addressing 
corporate control problems. 
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1.  Introduction 
  Channeling funds from savers to firms is one of the central problems facing an 
economy.  In a frictionless world with widely-dispersed and reliable information, 
financial assets are perfect substitutes, and are allocated independently of existing 
financial markets and intermediaries.  In this case, the institutional structure of the 
financial system is merely a veil.  Recent research casts serious doubt on this 
frictionless model because of implausible assumptions about the availability and quality 
of information.  In the presence of asymmetric information, financial structure has 
major impacts on the allocation of funds, the pace of capital formation, and the 
performance of the economy.
1 
  When lenders and firms face significant information asymmetries that create 
possibilities for opportunism by better-informed firms, banks may play an important 
role in financing and governing firms.  Owing to economies of scale and scope, banks 
are arguably well-positioned to finance and monitor firms.  Germany is the prototypical 
economy where universal banks, which offer a wide-range of financial services, 
allegedly exert substantial influence over firms, and thus Germany is ideal for studying 
bank-firm relations and bank intermediated finance.
2  The current study extracts 
testable implications from the German Bank Influence Model (GBIM), and evaluates 
these hypotheses empirically.   
  The widely-held view of German bank influence has three major components: 
                         
1 For surveys of parts of this voluminous literature, see Bernanke (1993), Brennan (2001), Hellwig 
(1991), and Hubbard (1998).  
2 Banks are important in two other G-7 countries -- France and Japan.  Germany is the preferred country 
to explore bank influence because the role of banks is more dominant than in France.  While banks play a 
substantial role in Japan, the use of bank finance "...has been largely a regulatory phenomenon" (Hodder 
and Tschoegl, 1992, p. 9), and a bank can hold only 5% of a firm's equity (this limit was 10% prior to 
1987).   
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finance, control, and profitability (cf.  Edwards and Fisher, 1994, Chapter 1).  German 
banks allegedly supply finance relatively cheaply because of technical expertise and 
superior information.  The latter follows from bank representation on firms' supervisory 
boards and long-term relations between banks and firms.  The second component of 
German bank influence is that banks reduce managerial agency costs associated with 
corporate control.  The superior information that lowers finance costs also permits 
banks to monitor management effectively.  In addition to representation on supervisory 
boards, banks have substantial voting power obtained either directly through ownership 
or indirectly through proxies, borrowings, or investment companies.  Consolidated 
voting power, supervisory board representation, and long-term relations combine to 
provide banks with the potential to substantially influence firms.  German banks thus 
would appear to have the power to solve the agency problem at the core of the 
corporate control dilemma and, with large ownership stakes, the incentive to exercise 
control.  In turn, lower finance costs for external funds and lower agency costs of 
corporate control have a favorable effect on firm profitability, the third component of 
the GBIM.   
  While these arguments are certainly reasonable, and perhaps even persuasive, 
alternative perspectives exist, and the GBIM needs to be evaluated empirically.  Several 
studies have pointed to positive roles that banks play in the success of the German 
system of investment finance.  This confidence has not gone unchallenged.  Deeg 
(1992, p. 3) argues that "the capacity of the German banks to influence the decisions of 
non-financial firms and coordinate the activities of industry is significantly more 
circumscribed than is widely assumed..."  Wenger (1992 and with Kaserer, 1998) has 
written extensively on the deleterious effects of German banks.  Perlitz and Seger 
(1994) and Seger (1997) find a negative influence of banks on firm performance.  In a 
recent and important book, Edwards and Fischer (1994, p. 240) conclude that "The 
commonly-held view of the merits of the German system of finance for investment, in  
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terms of the supply of external finance to firms and corporate control, receives no 
support from the analysis of available evidence." 
  However, most existing empirical work on Germany is based on relatively 
aggregate data or single cross-sections.  In her review of Edwards and Fischer's book, 
Elston (1995) notes that much of the debate on the merits of the bank-based vs. market-
based finance has stagnated simply due to lack of detailed empirical evidence.  Gorton 
(1995) expresses a similar concern, and calls for the use of firm-level cross sections to 
assess the influence of German banks.  Studies based on cross-tabulations of aggregate 
financial data, while informative, can not capture the complexities affecting financing 
choices.  There are many non-bank factors that vary across firms and influence 
financing decisions.  Failing to control for these factors can seriously bias inferences 
based on aggregated data.  Thus, micro-data are needed to assess the nature and extent 
of German bank influence. 
  This paper presents such a microeconomic inquiry by extracting testable 
implications from the GBIM.  Section 2 describes the financial statement and 
ownership data for German firms.  These panel data are transformed into a cross-
section, and we discuss the econometric reasons for focusing on cross-section 
information.    
  The finance, control, and profitability hypotheses are examined in Sections 3-5 in 
terms of three questions:  1) do bank influenced firms enjoy lower finance costs?; 2) is 
bank influence a solution to control problems?; 3) do bank influenced firms have higher 
profitability?  Apart from a standard regression analysis, we also use Leamer's Extreme 
Value Analysis to assess the fragility/sturdiness of our inferences and to address 
concerns about multicollinearity and equation specification.  We find that bank 
influence is not associated with a reduction of finance costs nor a change in 
profitability.  Our empirical evidence offers little support for the GBIM.  Rather a view 
of bank relations emerges where banks provide corporate control services and are  
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compensated by charging higher rates for borrowed funds and fees for a variety of other 
banking services.  As discussed in Section 6, bank influence seems to serve as a 
substitute control mechanism, one of several available for addressing corporate control 
problems that does not appear to offer any net advantage to firms. 
  This inquiry should be viewed as exploratory for several reasons.  The GBIM is a 
collection of plausible economic relations and behavioral responses, but is not based on 
a fully articulated model of optimizing agents constrained by information and agency 
problems and market forces.  Thus, we are reporting some interesting conditional 
correlations, not identifying deep structural links.  Moreover, we have not accounted 
for the possible endogeneity of bank affiliations.  As emphasized by Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985), control mechanisms may be selected on the basis of particular characteristics of 
firms and their governance problems.  While we control for several of these factors, we 
can not entirely discount the possibility of endogeneity bias.  Notwithstanding these 
concerns, explicit testing of the GBIM will be useful in generating a dialogue between 
empirical results and theoretical models.  Indeed, some of the testable propositions 
require auxiliary assumptions that have not been fully appreciated in the literature.  The 
goal of the current paper is to begin to develop micro-based empirical evidence that 
will inform views of corporate finance and governance problems and the possibly 




2.  The Data    
  An important innovation in the current study is the unique data used to examine 
bank influence in Germany.  Data are available for 91 firms (a listing is presented in the 
Appendix), and are drawn from financial statements and measures of ownership 
concentration.  These data are described in the first two sub-sections.  The final two 
sub-sections discuss the transformation of the data and sample characteristics.  
2.1.  The Bonn Database 
  The Bonn Database contains financial information on German industrial 
corporations quoted on the German stock exchange.
3  The Database is constructed from 
annual business reports of unconsolidated listed firms and the annual volumes (1965-
1990) of the Handbuch Der Aktiengesellschaften and the Statistisches Jahrbuch.  The 
specific variables drawn from the Bonn Database and listed in the tables are defined as 
follows: 
 
  BANKDEBT      =  Long-term bank debt (maturities ≥ five years) not secured by 
mortgages divided by TOTALASSETS.   
 
  BANKDEBT'      =  Long-term bank debt (maturities ≥ five years) not secured  
     by  mortgages  divided  by long-term debt (maturities ≥ five 
        years).   
 
  DIVIDENDS    =  Dividends on common and preferred equity divided by 
TOTALASSETS (multiplied by 100). 
 
  FIXED    =  Fixed assets less depreciation divided by TOTALASSETS. 
   
                         
3 All but one of the firms is organized as an AG.  The designation "AG" (Aktiengesellschaft, stock 
corporation) in Germany is comparable to "LTD" in the United Kingdom and "INC" in the United States.  
One firm is a KGaA (Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien), a hybrid between a limited liability partnership 
and a stock corporation with tradable shares.  See Edwards and Fischer (1994, Chapter 4) for more 
information about the legal forms of enterprises in Germany.   
 
6
  GROWTH          =  Investment in fixed assets divided by the replacement cost of 
fixed assets.  
   
  ICOVERAGE  =   The inverse of the coverage ratio (cash flow divided by total 
interest expenses, with cash flow defined as before-tax income 
plus depreciation). 
 
  LEVERAGE        =  The book value of all of the firm's liabilities (long-term, 
maturities ≥ five years; medium-term, maturities ≥ one year but 
< five years; and short-term, maturities < one year) divided by 
TOTALASSETS. 
 
  LT-DEBT     =  Long-term debt (maturities ≥ five years) divided by 
TOTALASSETS. 
 
  MARKET/BOOK =  The market value of equity (the number of shares outstanding 
at the end of the year multiplied by the year end share price) 
divided by the book value of equity. 
 
  NET LT-DEBT   =  Net long-term debt, LT-DEBT - BANKDEBT. 
 
  PROFITABILITY =  Return on assets, equal to net income (after pension payments 
but before taxes) and interest expense both divided by 
TOTALASSETS (multiplied by 100). 
 
  SIZE     =  An indicator variable ranging from 1 (smallest) to 4 (largest) 
defined by quartiles of TOTALASSETS.   
   
  TOTALASSETS   =  The book value of all of the firm's assets less depreciation on 
fixed assets less Qualifying Reserves, stated in billions of 
Deutsche Marks. 
 
  VOLATILITY     =  The standard deviation of cash flow (defined as before-tax 
income plus depreciation) divided by the mean of cash flow 




2.2.  Bank Influence And Ownership Concentration 
  The Bonn Database is supplemented with data on bank influence and ownership 
concentration obtained for 1966-1988 from company annual reports and annual issues 
of Wer Gehört Zu Wem and Atkienführer.  Bank influence (BI) is an indicator variable 
measuring direct ownership by a financial institution, and is defined as follows:  BI 
equals 1 if a national bank or a national insurance company a) holds more than 25% of 
the outstanding shares and no other owner holds more than 25% or b) holds more than 
50% of the outstanding shares; 0 otherwise (i.e., BI equal 1 when a national bank or 
national insurance company holds a majority or plurality (in excess of 25%) of the 
outstanding shares).
4  Under German corporate law, a 25% share of voting rights is 
sufficient to block any major proposal at the shareholders meeting.   
  We can also classify the 91 firms by ownership concentration, and define the 
following indicator variable:  CONCENTRATION  equals 1  if a) a single stockholder 
holds more than 50% of the shares or b) a limited number (two or three) of stockholders 
together hold more than 75% of the shares; 0 otherwise.
5  Note that 
CONCENTRATION is defined inclusive of financial institution ownership; 
consequently, a firm could be both concentrated and bank influenced. 
                         
4 The data did not permit separation of banks from other financial institutions.  These direct ownership 
data are available for each year, and hence the ownership characteristic can vary over the sample, though 
the variation is limited. The financial institution is identified with the category in which it appears most 
frequently over the sample.   
5
 Firms are classified into one of the following six mutually exclusive categories in the original data: a) a 
single stockholder holds more than 75% of the shares; b) several (two or three) stockholders together hold 
more than 75% of the shares; c) a single stockholder holds more than 50% of the shares; d) several (two 
or three) stockholders together hold more than 50% of the shares; e) a single stockholder holds more than 
25% of the shares; f) there exists no stockholder holding more than 25% of the shares.  These ownership 
concentration data are available for each year, and hence the concentration characteristic of a firm can 
vary over the sample.  The firm is identified with the category in which it appears most frequently over 
the sample.  The indicator variable is defined as follows: 





2.3.  Data Transformation  
  The questions motivating this study focus on long-run differences between firms 
with and without bank affiliations, and hence are cross-section in nature.  However, 
since there is variation in both the cross-section and time dimensions, one is tempted to 
exploit all of this variation by pooling the data and estimating a fixed-effects model.  
Two reasons suggest resisting this temptation.  First, since bank influence changes very 
little over time, behavioral responses to bank influence can be identified only in the 
cross-section.  Second, using the available time variation would necessitate specifying 
the temporal dynamics of the financial variables.  While these dynamics are interesting 
in their own right, they raise specification issues that may bias estimates of the 
parameters of interest in this study.  For example, if firms smooth earnings, then annual 
earnings will be a misleading measure of period t profitability; the averaging procedure 
used here is unaffected by this intertemporal distortion.  Several of these points have 
been considered formally by Pesaran and Smith (1995) in a random coefficients 
framework with exogenous regressors.  These authors establish three important 
properties of coefficients estimated from a cross-section model: 1) they represent the 
long-run average effects; 2) they are consistent for large T; and 3) they are robust to 
misspecification of dynamics in the underlying micro model.  Furthermore, even when 
the model is correctly specified, they show that the fixed-effects model generates 
inconsistent estimates.  Thus, several considerations suggest a cross-section analysis of 
the dataset, and all of the data have been averaged along the time dimension.
6   
2.4.  Sample Characteristics 
  Table 1 contains the means and standard deviations of the variables used in this 
study.  Statistics are presented for the total sample and for SIZE, an indicator variable 
defined by quartiles of TOTALASSETS.  There are few regularities in these cross-
                         
6 For those series analyzed as ratios, the ratios are computed and then summed over time; that is, ratioi = 
Σt (ai,t / bi,t).  All of the ratios are defined so that bi,t is far from zero.  This procedure obviates the need for 
price deflators, which are unavailable on a firm-specific basis.   
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Table 1:  Sample Characteristics Of 91 German Firms: 1965-1990: Means and Standard Deviations 
 
 
Quartiles are determined by TOTALASSETS; the fourth quartile contains one fewer firm.  
BANKDEBT is long-term bank debt (maturities ≥ five years) not secured by mortgages divided by 
TOTALASSETS.  BANKDEBT' is long-term bank debt (maturities ≥ five years) not secured by 
mortgages divided by long-term debt (maturities ≥ five years).  DIVIDENDS is dividends on common 
and preferred equity divided by TOTALASSETS (multiplied by 100).  FIXED is fixed assets less 
depreciation divided by TOTALASSETS.  GROWTH is investment in fixed assets divided by the 
replacement cost of fixed assets.  ICOVERAGE is the inverse of the coverage ratio (cash flow divided 
by interest expenses, with cash flow defined as before-tax income plus depreciation).  LEVERAGE is 
the book value of all of the firm's liabilities (Long-Term, maturities ≥ five years; Medium-Term, 
maturities ≥ one year but < five years; and Short-Term, maturities < one year) divided by 
TOTALASSETS.  LT-DEBT is long-term debt (maturities ≥ five years) divided by TOTALASSETS.  
MARKET/BOOK is the market value of equity (the number of shares outstanding at the end of the year 
multiplied by the year end share price) divided by the book value of equity.  NET LT-DEBT is LT-
DEBT less BANKDEBT.  PROFITABILITY is return on assets, equal to net income (after pension 
payments but before taxes) and interest expense both divided by TOTALASSETS (multiplied by 100).  
TOTALASSETS is the book value of all of the firm's assets less depreciation on fixed assets less 
Qualifying Reserves, and is stated in billions of Deutsche Marks.  VOLATILITY is the standard 
deviation of cash flow divided by the mean of cash flow (i.e., the coefficient of variation of cash flow).  
BANKDEBT, BANKDEBT', DIVIDENDS, FIXED, GROWTH, ICOVERAGE, LEVERAGE, LT-
DEBT, MARKET/BOOK, NET LT-DEBT, and PROFITABILITY, are computed as firm ratios 
averaged for 1965-1990.  BI, CONCENTRATION, and SIZE are qualitative variables.   
BI equals 1 if a national bank or a national insurance company a) holds more than 25% of the 
outstanding shares and no other owner holds more than 25% or b) holds more than 50% of the 
outstanding shares evaluated from 1966-1988.  CONCENTRATION  equals 1 if a) a single stockholder 
holds more than 50% of the shares or b) a limited number (two or three) of stockholders together hold 
more than 75% of the shares evaluated from 1966-1988.  SIZE ranges from 1 (smallest) to 4 (largest) 
defined by quartiles of TOTALASSETS.     
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Table 1 (continued):  Sample Characteristics Of 91 German Firms: 1965-1990  
                                 -- Means and Standard Deviations 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                                                     Quartiles                                          Total 
                                   ________________________________________________________________ 
 
Variable       (1)                   (2)                        (3)                            (4)                                   (5) 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
BANKDEBT            0.102           0.105            0.073        0.089       0.092  
                  (0.057)        (0.074)         (0.052)         (0.048)            (0.059)  
 
BANKDEBT'   0.146   0.160   0.103   0.133   0.136 
    (0.070) (0.107) (0.073) (0.089)  (0.084) 
                                                                                
DIVIDENDS        1.505      2.611        1.947     2.072      2.033  
    (0.866) (1.500) (0.654) (1.050)  (1.120)   
 
FIXED              0.394             0.375            0.538            0.616            0.479  
            (0.372)  (0.167)  (0.568)  (0.532)  (0.443) 
 
GROWTH              0.172            0.160            0.155            0.139            0.157  
                (0.060)  (0.043)  (0.070)  (0.060)  (0.059)  
 
ICOVERAGE     0.344            0.290            0.244            0.218               0.275 
                   (0.304)         (0.321)         (0.228)         (0.219)            (0.272) 
 
LEVERAGE       0.685            0.626            0.693            0.673           0.669  
               (0.112)  (0.109)  (0.092)  (0.109)  (0.107)                              
 
LT-DEBT      0.178       0.158     0.215        0.203     0.188  
                 (0.094)  (0.047)  (0.088)  (0.065)  (0.078)  
 
MARKET/BOOK         2.524            2.123            2.413            2.083            2.288  
              (1.188)  (0.852)  (1.028)  (0.963)  (1.016) 
 
NET LT-DEBT         0.077            0.053            0.143            0.114               0.096 
                   (0.106)         (0.057)         (0.098)         (0.068)            (0.090) 
 
PROFITABILITY   4.479            5.032            4.579            4.947               4.762 
    (1.157)         (1.415)         (1.149)         (1.723)            (1.374) 
 
TOTALASSETS      31.7        96.0       387.3      2802.3          807.6  
     (12.5)  (30.2)  (139.0)  (2581.9)  (1691.6)                            
 
VOLATILITY        0.554            0.517            0.495            0.521           0.522  
            (0.387)  (0.263)  (0.220)  (0.212)  (0.276)  
    
Qualitative Variables  
BI    0.217   0.130   0.087   0.091   0.132 
CONCENTRATION   0.696            0.565            0.609            0.500           0.593 
SIZE   1.000   2.000   3.000   4.000   2.484   
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  tabulations.  GROWTH and  ICOVERAGE fall monotonically with firm size.  BI  
declines with size over the first three quartiles, but rises slightly in the fourth quartile.  
Variables that are key elements in the GBIM -- BANKDEBT, NET LT-DEBT, and 
PROFITABILITY -- show no obvious relations to size.   
 
3.  The Finance Hypothesis 
3.1.      Direct 
3.1.1.  Testable Implications  
  According to the GBIM, banks can supply funds relatively cheaply because of 
their ability to reduce information problems, which are the fundamental friction 
between borrowers and lenders.  As shareholders, banks are allowed representation on 
the firm's supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat), and thus they obtain useful information 
about the firm that is not widely available.  Since banks usually hold shares over long 
periods of time, they have the incentive and the ability to engage in extensive and 
ongoing information gathering about the firm.
7  Information problems are thus reduced.  
Coupled with their technical expertise, banks are able to offer relatively inexpensive 
external finance to affiliated firms.  One testable implication of this outward shift in the 
loan supply curve is that, ceteris paribus, the balance sheets of bank influenced firms 
should contain a greater proportion of bank debt.
8 
  Of course, other things are rarely equal, as many additional factors determine the 
amount of bank debt held by firms.  For example, we might expect that bank debt is 
positively related to the cash flow volatility, as firms subject to sharp swings in cash 
flow value an ongoing bank relation and a readily available line of credit.  Sorting the 
                         
7 See Deeg (1992), Edwards and Fischer (1994), Mülbert (1998), Perlitz and Seger (1994), and Smith 
(1994) for detailed descriptions of the German banking system.   
8 An additional implication is that loan interest rates should be lower for bank influenced firms.  
Unfortunately, interest rate data are unavailable and, even if available, would need to be adjusted for loan 
maturity, the borrower's credit rating, and the non-price terms of lending.   
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sample into quartiles based on cash flow volatility, we find that the ratio of bank debt to 
total assets (BANKDEBT) is 0.08 for firms in the first two (relatively stable) quartiles.  
The bank debt ratio increases to 0.09 and 0.11 for the latter two quartiles as cash flow 
volatility increases.  The impact of cash flow volatility and other factors on the use of 
bank debt indicates that assessments of bank influence must condition on firm-specific 
characteristics to avoid biases from omitted variables.  Micro-data are thus essential for 
generating an accurate evaluation of the GBIM.  
  Based on these considerations, the direct finance hypothesis is tested with the 
following Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) specification, 
 
  BANKDEBT  =  Φ[BI: Z
F]  +  ε  ,         ( 1 )  
                                  + 
where BI is an indicator variable for bank influence, Φ[.] is a linear function, ε is a 
stochastic error, and Z
F represents the set of conditioning variables necessary for 
evaluating the finance hypothesis: a constant, the size of the firm in terms of total 
assets, the growth of the capital stock, the ratio of market to book equity, the volatility 
of cash flow, ownership concentration, and the amount of dividends, fixed assets, and 
net income plus interest expense, all relative to total assets.  (The sensitivity of the 
empirical results to variations in this lengthy list of conditioning variables is examined 
with an Extreme Value Analysis.)  The direct finance hypothesis associated with the 
GBIM is evaluated by the coefficient on BI.   
3.1.2.  Empirical Results 
  We begin to test the direct finance hypothesis by OLS estimates of (1).  Column 1 of 
Table 2 contains results with our measure of bank influence and the full set of conditioning 
variables.  Focusing on coefficients statistically significant at conventional levels, we see 
that bank debt is higher for concentrated firms and firms with more volatile cash flow.  The 
BI coefficient central to our evaluation of the GBIM is negative but statistically close to 
zero.    
 
13
  Table 2:  Ordinary Least Squares Regressions -- Dependent Variables: BANKDEBT Or BANKDEBT' 
 
 
For all but the last two rows, the entries are based on the following Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression model (1):  BANKDEBT (or BANKDEBT') = Φ[BI : Z
F] + ε.  Φ[.] is a linear function, ε is 
a stochastic error, and Z
F represents the set of conditioning variables listed in Panel B.  Columns 1 and 
5 use the full set of conditioning variables; columns 2 and 6 use those conditioning variables 
significant at the 10% level in the initial regression.  The dependent variable is BANKDEBT in 
columns 1-4 and BANKDEBT' in columns 5 and 6.  All variables are described in Table 1.  Estimated 
coefficients are reported in the table; standard errors are in parentheses and are heteroscedastic 
consistent using the technique of White (1980) with a bias correction (Davidson and MacKinnon, 
1993, pp. 552-554, equation HC2).  RSS is the residual sum of squares.  The remaining two entries are 
based on the following OLS regression model that permits both the constant term and slope 
coefficients to differ for bank influenced firms:  BANKDEBT = Φ[BI*Z
F: Z
F] + ε.  Ω is the p-value for 
the F-statistic testing the null hypothesis that the interaction variables, BI*Z
F, have no effect on 
BANKDEBT.  This statistic is distributed F(K,N-2K), where K is the number of conditioning variables 
(including the constant term).  Γ is the percentage change in BANKDEBT with respect to an increase 
in BI.  For firms having BI=0, BI is changed from 0 to 1, and the fitted values of BANKDEBT are 
computed; for firms having BI=1, BI is changed from 1 to 0, the fitted values of BANKDEBT are 
computed, and are multiplied by -1.  Γ equals the mean of the ratio of these fitted values divided by 
BANKDEBT.  Ω and Γ measure the statistical and economic importance, respectively, of the 
interaction variables.  Columns 3 and 4 contain the Extreme Value Analysis (EVA) using all possible 
combinations of the conditioning variables.   Column 3 contains the mean, standard deviation, lower 
bound, and upper bound of the distribution of the estimated BI coefficient.  Column 4 contains the 
same statistics for the distribution of the associated t-statistic.      
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Table 2 (continued):  Ordinary Least Squares Regressions -- Dependent Variables: BANKDEBT 




                                                    BANKDEBT                           EVA                            _BANKDEBT' 
                                                                                     Coefficients  T-Statistics 
Variable                                       (1)           (2)         (3)              (4)                        (5)          (6)                 .   
 
A. Bank Influence Variable 
 
BI                                              -0.008     -0.012          0.006     -0.008 
                                              (0.017)    (0.014)        (0.027)    (0.025) 
  
Mean        -0.016       -1.067   
[Standard Deviation]        [0.005]      [0.343] 
Minimum        -0.028       -1.802 
Maximum          -0.005       -0.291  
 
B. Conditioning Variables 
 
Constant                                     0.053       0.045        0.078       0.105 
                                              (0.039)    (0.020)      (0.052)    (0.028) 
 
CONCENTRATION                  0.027       0.027        0.040       0.036 
                                              (0.013)    (0.011)       (0.019)    (0.016) 
 
DIVIDENDS                              0.000              0.007 
                                              (0.016)          (0.018) 
 
FIXED                                        0.015            0.032 
                                                  (0.019)           (0.028) 
 
GROWTH                                 -0.055            -0.075 
                                              (0.127)          (0.186) 
 
MARKET/BOOK                      -0.005           -0.013 
                                               (0.008)         (0.011) 
 
PROFITABILITY                       0.005        .      0.008 
                                              (0.009)         (0.011) 
 
SIZE                                          -0.008            -0.013     -0.007 
                                                 (0.005)           (0.007)    (0.007) 
 
VOLATILITY                            0.066        0.061       0.072       0.056 
                                              (0.034)    (0.037)      (0.036)    (0.043) 
   
 
Adjusted R
2                                0.113      0.126      0.093      0.062 
RSS                                            0.251       0.265       0.518      0.568 
Ω                                               0.987       0.870      0.992      0.910    
Γ                                              -0.504      -0.277                                                -0.453     -0.194  
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  The results for BI can be sensitive to the conditioning variables included in the 
regression, and three further tests are undertaken.  First, columns 2 presents results where the 
conditioning variables insignificant at the 10% level in the initial regressions are removed.  
In these restricted regressions, the coefficient on BI remains negative and statistically and 
economically insignificant.   
  Second, the above results allow only the constant term to shift in response to 
bank influence.  By interacting BI with the conditioning variables, we can allow both 
the constant term and slope coefficients to differ for bank influenced firms, and we 
estimate the following model, 
 
  BANKDEBT  =  Φ[BI*Z
F: Z
F]  +  ε  .            ( 1 ' )  
 
The statistical significance of the interaction variables, BI*Z
F is assessed by an F-test, 
and the p-values (Ω) reported in Table 2 indicate that the bank influence variable is 
statistically insignificant in both regressions.  Alternatively, the economic significance 
of the interaction variables can be assessed by calculating Γ, the percentage change in 
BANKDEBT when an independent firm becomes affiliated with a bank (and vice versa 
for bank affiliated firms).
9  If bank influence leads to a substantially favorable shift in 
the supply curve of bank loans, Γ will be positive and large.  Instead of an outward 
movement, bank influence leads to a large inward shift of the supply curve, and existing 
loans decline substantially.  Our micro-data evidence complements the findings of 
Corbett and Jenkinson (1998, Table 1) and Mayer (1990, Table 12.3), who show with 
aggregate data that Germany utilizes less bank debt than most other industrialized 
countries.  Taken together, these results from micro and aggregate datasets raise the 
question as to which characteristics define a bank-based economy.  
  Third, the above procedures are two of several ways to conduct specification 
                         
9 See the notes to Table 2 for details about the computation of Γ.    
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searches.  However, inquisitive (cynical?) readers may be left wondering whether there 
is some other combination of correlated regressors that might alter inferences.  The 
structure of our research problem permits us to address this skepticism 
straightforwardly.  The direct finance hypothesis only concerns the BI coefficient.  
While some of the conditioning variables may be important determinants of bank loans, 
the actual combination is unimportant for the hypothesis of interest.  Applying the 
Extreme Value Analysis (EVA) proposed by Leamer (1983), we estimate (1) with all 
possible combinations of the conditioning variables, and report the mean, standard 
deviation, minimum value, and maximum value of the distribution of the estimated BI 
coefficient, as well as similar characteristics for the distribution of its  
t-statistic.  In the present case with eight conditioning variables (listed in Table 2), 2
8 = 
256 regressions are estimated.   
  The results from the EVA presented in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 corroborate 
the above findings.  The statistics for the distribution of estimated coefficients are 
reported in column 3, and show that, regardless of the linear combinations of the Z
F 
variables, it is impossible to obtain a positive coefficient on BI.  The t-values in column 
4 indicate that these coefficients are usually far from zero in a statistical sense.   
  These results are at odds with the GBIM, and suggest alternative interpretations 
of the bank influence/lending relation.  Rajan (1992) and Sharpe (1990) have argued 
that the ex-post information monopoly (relative to alternative lenders) provides banks a 
substantial bargaining advantage that may be difficult to guard against ex-ante.  In this 
situation, banks "holdup" firms with which they are associated, loan rates rise, and loan 
volume falls.  Portfolio considerations further suggest that a bank with a substantial 
stake in a firm's equity may want to attenuate its exposure by issuing less debt to that 
firm.  Either of these alternative scenarios implies that, ceteris paribus, the BI 
coefficient in (1) will be negative.   
  A third scenario suggests that the GBIM is valid but that our test based on the  
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ratio of bank debt to total assets may be misleading.
10  The problem occurs because 
bank influence can also lower the cost of equity.  In this case, the firm's capital 
structure would be tilted away from debt in general and, as in Table 2, we would expect 
to see a negative relation between BANKDEBT and BI.  We can account for this lower 
equity cost effect by defining BANKDEBT' as the ratio of bank debt to total debt.  
Results are presented in columns 5 and 6 of Table 2, and give some mild support to the 
equity cost hypothesis.  The BI coefficients in columns 5 and 6 are slightly more 
positive (or less negative) than the comparable coefficients in columns 1 and 2, 
respectively.  Nonetheless, the coefficients remain statistically close to zero.  
  In sum, the evidence in Table 2 provides no support for the proposition that bank 
affiliation directly lowers the cost of finance, and hence no support for the direct 
finance hypothesis associated with the GBIM.   
3.2.    Indirect 
3.2.1.  Testable Implications  
  A bank relation can also lower a firm's finance costs indirectly through a 
certification effect.  Evaluating business fundamentals and monitoring firm 
performance entail substantial fixed costs.  For most creditors, these costs are high 
(relative to the return on investible funds), and extending credit in a prudent fashion 
becomes unprofitable.  However, bank affiliation can be a forceful signal of the firm's 
creditworthiness.  Information advantages (through supervisory board representation 
and long-term relations), technical expertise, and direct ownership stakes enable banks 
to generate credible signals about a firm's creditworthiness.  In the United States, James 
(1987) and Lummer and McConnell (1989) establish that an announcement of a new 
bank loan or a bank line of credit has a greater positive effect on the firm's stock price 
than an announcement of an alternative source of credit.     
  Certification lowers the cost of external funds, and is most likely to be evident 
                         
10
  We thank one of our reviewers for suggesting this scenario.  
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for credits with lengthy maturities.  If the GBIM is valid, we would expect bank 
influenced firms to have higher proportions of long-term debt, net of bank debt, on their 
balance sheets.  The indirect finance hypothesis is evaluated by the coefficients on BI in 
the following OLS specifications, 
 
 NET LT-DEBT    =  Φ[BI: Z
F]  +  ε,         ( 2 )  
                                       + 
where NET LT-DEBT equals long-term debt net of long-term bank debt divided by 
total assets and the conditioning variables (ZF) are the same for both the direct and 
indirect finance hypotheses.    
3.2.2.  Empirical Results 
  The indirect financing hypothesis is examined in Table 3, which reports OLS 
estimates of (2).  As in Table 2, column 1 utilizes the full set of conditioning variables, 
while column 2 uses only those conditioning variables significant initially.  We find 
that NET LT-DEBT rises with MARKET/BOOK (as "winners" get funded more easily 
from outside sources) and SIZE (in accord with the consensus view noted by Harris and 
Raviv, 1991), and falls with VOLATILITY (as the firm becomes more risky).  The BI 
coefficients are negative and statistically close to zero.
11  The Ω statistics indicate that, 
in regressions where BI interacts with the conditioning variables, these interactions are 
statistically insignificant.  The EVA in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 confirms the 
difficulty in uncovering evidence supporting the GBIM, as the bank influence 
coefficient is always estimated imprecisely.  The results in Table 2 indicate firmly that 
finance costs are not lower for firms affiliated with banks. 
 
                         
11 If NET LT-DEBT is replaced by NET LEVERAGE (LEVERAGE less BANKDEBT), the coefficients 
on BI continue to be statistically close to zero.  The only important difference is that the R
2's double.   
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Table 3:  Ordinary Least Squares Regressions -- Dependent Variable: NET LT-DEBT 
 
 
For all but the last two rows, the entries are based on the following Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression model (2):  NET LT-DEBT = Φ[BI : Z
F] + ε.  Φ[.] is a linear function, ε is a stochastic 
error, and Z
F represents the set of conditioning variables listed in Panel B.  Column 1 uses the full set 
of conditioning variables; column 2 uses those conditioning variables significant at the 10% level in 
the initial regression.  All variables are described in Table 1.  Estimated coefficients are reported in the 
table; standard errors are in parentheses and are heteroscedastic consistent using the technique of White 
(1980) with a bias correction (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993, pp. 552-554, equation HC2).  RSS is 
the residual sum of squares.  The remaining two entries are based on the following OLS regression 
model that permits both the constant term and slope coefficients to differ for bank influenced firms:  
NET LT-DEBT = Φ[BI*Z
F: Z
F] + ε.  Ω is the p-value for the F-statistic testing the null hypothesis that 
the interaction variables, BI*Z
F, have no effect on NET LT-DEBT.  This statistic is distributed F(K,N-
2K), where K is the number of conditioning variables (including the constant term).  Γ is the 
percentage change in NET LT-DEBT with respect to an increase in BI.  For firms having BI=0, BI is 
changed from 0 to 1, and the fitted values of NET LT-DEBT are computed; for firms having BI=1, BI 
is changed from 1 to 0, the fitted values of NET LT-DEBT are computed, and are multiplied by -1.  Γ 
equals the mean of the ratio of these fitted values divided by NET LT-DEBT.  (In one case, the mean of 
NET LT-DEBT is very close to zero; the resulting outlier has been removed from the Γ statistics in 
columns 1 and 2.)  Ω and Γ measure the statistical and economic importance, respectively, of the 
interaction variables.  Columns 3 and 4 contain the Extreme Value Analysis (EVA) using all possible 
combinations of the conditioning variables.  Column 3 contains the mean, standard deviation, lower 
bound, and upper bound of the distribution of the estimated BI coefficient.  Column 4 contains the 








                                                                                             _     EVA               .              
                                                                                     Coefficients  T-Statistics 




A. Bank Influence Variable 
 
BI                                           -0.011    -0.002 
                                              (0.022)    (0.023) 
  
Mean         0.003           0.095 
[Standard Deviation]        [0.010]        [0.400] 
Minimum        -0.021         -0.898 
Maximum           0.024           0.854 
 
B. Conditioning Variables 
Constant                                 0.039    0.070    
                                           (0.054)   (0.034)  
 
CONCENTRATION             -0.026    
                                          (0.018)      
 
DIVIDENDS                         -0.008    
                                          (0.009)      
 
FIXED                                   0.040        0.018  
                                         (0.024)    (0.018)    
 
GROWTH                             0.199        
                                         (0.197)        
 
MARKET/BOOK                  0.020    0.018  
                                         (0.011)   (0.010)      
 
PROFITABILITY                 0.005  
                                        (0.008)    
 
SIZE                                     0.018   0.019  
                                         (0.008)  (0.008)        
 
VOLATILITY                     -0.140  -0.135  





2                                     0.219   0.222   . 
RSS                                      0.517   0.541  
Ω                                         0.515   0.863     
Γ                                        -0.024   0.269     
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4.  The Control Hypothesis  
4.1.  Testable Implications 
  The early corporate governance literature, as well as recent work on agency 
theory, has focused on the issues raised by widely-dispersed shareholdings in market-
finance economies.
12  The combined demands for huge sums of capital by firms and 
diversified portfolios by investors results in owners who usually possess little 
information, expertise, or incentive to monitor or discipline management.  Ideally, these 
agency problems between owners and managers are solved by a financial system with 
the proper incentives so that managers, while acting in their self-interest, behave 
consistent with the goals of the owners.  With a widely-dispersed ownership, creating 
such an incentive-compatible financial system is difficult because individual owners 
have little inducement to monitor management performance nor fund distressed firms.  
That is, free-rider problems loom large.  Unresolved agency problems, combined with 
the impossibility of writing contracts that cover all future possibilities, lead to corporate 
control problems (Hart, 1995). 
  There are several institutional arrangements for achieving corporate control.  A 
hostile takeover by equity accumulation is one possibility.
13  However, notwithstanding 
the recent takeovers of Mannesmann by Vodafone and Kamps by Barilla, this corporate 
                         
12 See Roe (1994), Sable, Griffin, and Deeg (1993), and Zysman (1983) for historical overviews of the 
corporate governance literature from a political economy perspective, Roy (1997) for a critique of the 
economic efficiency approach from a sociological perspective, Lindberg, Campbell, and Hollingsworth 
(1991) for an analytic framework that combines the insights from many different social science 
disciplines, Hart (1995) for a theoretical overview of corporate governance issues in the context of 
financial economics, and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) for a recent comprehensive survey of the corporate 
governance literature.  
13 The effectiveness of hostile takeovers as a mechanism for corporate control has been questioned by 
empirical results for the United Kingdom (Franks and Mayer, 1996) and the United States (Martin and 
McConnell, 1991).  Stiglitz (1985) presents theoretical arguments that hostile takeovers are not an 
effective control mechanism in market-finance economies.  He believes that banks through the issuance 
of debt may be more effective in achieving corporate control.    
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control mechanism is used rarely in Germany.
14  For the period 1988-1996, there were 
17 hostile takeovers in Germany.  Relative to approximately 600 listed firms, hostile 
takeovers amount to 0.3% per year.  By contrast, the United Kingdom had 320 hostile 
takeovers for the period January 1985 to June 1996, corresponding to a rate of 1.5% per 
year.
15   
  Four other mechanisms for corporate control may be operative in Germany.  
First, sufficiently concentrated ownership directly attenuates the free-rider problem, and 
creates incentives for owners to invest resources to address agency problems.  Second, 
dividends can serve as a control device.  For a given investment policy and cash flow, 
dividend payouts force management into external capital markets where control costs 
may be lower (Easterbrook, 1984).  Third, mandatory interest payments also reduce the 
scope of managerial discretion, and enhance control.
16  
  Fourth, banks may exercise a notable amount of control over the firm in several 
ways.  As mentioned above, banks frequently hold seats on the firm's supervisory 
board.  This representation frequently results in a banker serving as the chair.
17  As 
members of the supervisory board, banks appoint the management board (Vorstand, 
whose members can not be members of the supervisory board).  Bank control is further 
                         
14 Kester (1992, p. 95) reports that the wave of acquisitions in the late 1980's was due in large part to a 
preannounced capital gains tax increase for 1990.    
15 The German and United Kingdom data on hostile takeovers are from Jenkinson and Ljungqvist 
(2001, p. 398) and Cosh and Guest (2001, p. 7), respectively.  The percentages are computed as the 
average number of takeovers divided by the average number of listed shares.  The latter figure is 
difficult to estimate precisely because some listed firms are not subject to takeover due to, inter alia, 
their status as investment trusts (closed-end funds) or a sufficiently large ownership concentration that 
makes a hostile takeover virtually impossible. 
 
16 The role of debt as a control device has been studied by, among others, Grossman and Hart (1982), 
Harris and Raviv (1990), and Jensen (1986).   
17 Chairing the supervisory board is particularly important because, for AG's with more than 2,000 
employees, half of the supervisory board is elected by the employees.  The chair is in a position to break 
tie votes of the supervisory board.    
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enhanced by voting rights exercised at the annual shareholders meeting 
(Hauptversammlung).  Voting rights are obtained directly from ownership stakes and 
indirectly in three ways: through proxies from shares deposited in trustee accounts 
(Depotstimmrecht),
18 by the lending of votes among banks (Stimmenleihe), and through 
shares held by investment companies owned by banks (Publikumsfonds).
19  The 
combination of direct ownership, proxies, and other indirect ways of obtaining voting 
rights leads to a substantial consolidation of power.  The overall proportion of voting 
rights exercised by banks at the 1992 shareholders meetings of the 24 largest widely 
held stock corporations ranged from 44%-99% and averaged 84%.  Of this latter figure, 
10% is due to investment companies, 13% to direct ownership, and 61% to proxies 
(Baums, 1996, p. 149).  Consolidated voting power, supervisory board representation, 
and long-term relations would appear to provide German banks with the power to solve 
agency problems at the core of the corporate control dilemma and, with large ownership 
stakes, the incentive to exercise control.  
  If German bank influence is a substitute control mechanism, we should find, 
ceteris paribus, a negative relation between bank influenced firms and one or more of 
the other three mechanisms for exercising corporate control.  Since bank influence is 
measured by a binary indicator variable, the control hypothesis is examined in terms of 
the following probit specification,   
 BI  =  Ψ[CONCENTRATION, DIVIDENDS, ICOVERAGE : Z
C]  +  ε,    (3) 
                              -                            -                        -  
                         
18 In the 1970s, almost half of the total shares issued were deposited in such bank trustee accounts 
(Gessler Commission, 1979; Krummel, 1980).  In 1990, more than three-quarters of the value of domestic 
shares held outside the Bundesbank were in the custody of private banks (Smith, 1994, p. 359). 
19 Unlike open-end or closed-end mutual funds in the United States, German investment companies are 
corporations usually owned by universal banks, and the stocks in an investment company's portfolio are 
voted by the owners.  Stock in a parent bank held in an investment company's portfolio can be voted at 
the parent bank's annual meeting and, in 1992, these votes were cast uniformly in support of the proposals 
favored by the parent bank's management.  See Baums (1996, esp. Sections 4.2.1 and 4.5.2) for an 
excellent introduction to German investment companies and their relations with universal banks.   
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where Ψ[.] is a non-linear function, CONCENTRATION is ownership concentration, 
DIVIDENDS is dividends on common and preferred equity divided by total assets 
(multiplied by 100), ICOVERAGE is the inverse of the coverage ratio (cash flow 
divided by interest expenses), Z
C is composed of the same conditioning variables as Z
F 
with the exclusion of CONCENTRATION and DIVIDENDS.  Negative coefficients on 
CONCENTRATION, DIVIDENDS, or ICOVERAGE support the hypothesis that bank 
influence serves as a control mechanism.   
4.2.  Empirical Results 
  If bank influence is a mechanism for corporate control, then, ceteris paribus, it 
should be negatively associated with one or more of the variables representing other 
corporate control mechanisms.  This aspect of the GBIM is examined in the probit 
equations presented in Table 4.  Two of the corporate control variables -- DIVIDENDS 
and ICOVERAGE -- are never statistically significant, even in regressions (not 
reported) in which either variable appears as the only corporate control variable.
20   
  The results with CONCENTRATION, however, are striking and robust.  
CONCENTRATION enters significantly negative in the models in the first two 
columns of Table 4.  The EVA in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 establishes the sturdiness 
of this inference, as it is impossible to obtain anything other than a negative sign on 
CONCENTRATION.  Moreover, these coefficients are usually statistically significant 
at conventional levels.  Table 4 suggests that bank influence is a substitute mechanism 
for controlling corporations. 
  CONCENTRATION also has an economically important impact on the 
                         
20 However, if banks exercise control by increasing dividends or interest payments, a positive correlation 
between BI and DIVIDENDS or ICOVERAGE could emerge, and the negative effect of DIVIDENDS or 
ICOVERAGE could be masked.  To explore this possible bias, we run regressions with DIVIDENDS or 
ICOVERAGE regressed against 1) BI and a constant, 2) BI and Z
C, and 3) BI*Z
C and Z
C.  The null 
hypothesis that the bank influence variable(s) has no effect is easily sustained.     
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Table 4:  Probit Regressions -- Dependent Variable: BI  
The entries are based on the following Probit regression model (3):  BI = Ψ[CONCENTRATION, 
DIVIDENDS, ICOVERAGE : Z
C] + ε.   Ψ[.] is a non-linear function, ε is a stochastic error, and Z
C 
represents the set of conditioning variables listed in Panel B.  Column 1 uses the full set of 
conditioning variables; column 2 uses those conditioning variables significant at the 10% level in the 
initial regression.  All variables are described in Table 1.  Estimated coefficients are reported in the 
table; standard errors are in parentheses.  RSS is the residual sum of squares.  Θ is based on the 
following Probit regression model that permits both the constant term and slope coefficients to differ 
for bank influenced firms:  BI = Ψ[CONCENTRATION*Z
C: Z
C] + ε.  Θ is the p-value for the log 
likelihood statistic testing the null hypothesis that the interaction variables, CONCENTRATION*Z
C, 
have no effect on BI.  (Non-linearities inherent in the probit model preclude examining interaction 
variables with the F-test used in Tables 2, 3, and 5.)  This statistic is distributed χ
2(K), where K is the 
number of conditioning variables (including the constant term).  ∆+ and ∆- are based on the following 
Probit regression: BI= Ψ[CONCENTRATION: Z
C] + ε, and measure the sensitivity of a firm's 
probability of being bank influenced to CONCENTRATION.  (Since CONCENTRATION is discrete, 
the standard measure of sensitivity, the analytic derivative of the cumulative distribution function, is 
inappropriate.)  The firms are divided into two groups: group one comprises those firms with 
CONCENTRATION=0; group two comprises those firms with CONCENTRATION=1.  ∆+ is 
computed with the first group of firms by changing CONCENTRATION from 0 to 1 for this subset of 
firms, computing the probability of a firm being bank influenced holding all other variables constant, 
subtracting this counterfactual probability from the probability estimated in the probit equation when 
CONCENTRATION=0, and averaging the changes across all the firms in this subset.  ∆- is computed 
in a similar procedure but with the second group of firms and with a change in CONCENTRATION 
from 1 to 0.  The number in braces is the probability estimated in the probit equation when 
CONCENTRATION=0 (for the first group of firms) or CONCENTRATION=1 (for the second group 
of firms).  Columns 3-6 contain the Extreme Value Analysis using all possible combinations of the 
conditioning variables.  Columns 3 and 5 contains the mean, standard deviation, lower bound, and 
upper bound of the distribution of the estimated BI coefficient.  Columns 4 and 6 contain the same 
statistics for the distribution of the associated t-statistic.  Columns 3 and 4 differ from those in columns 
5 and 6 in the number of firms used in the analysis:  columns 3 and 4 use the full sample including 
firms controlled by national enterprises, while columns 5 and 6 excludes these firms.  
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Table 4 (continued):  Probit Regressions -- Dependent Variable: BI 
 ____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                                                                   EVA                              EVA (restricted sample) . 
                                                                                     Coefficients  T-Statistics             Coefficients  T-Statistics 
Variable                                    (1)          (2)                      (3)             (4)                              (5)             (6) _         .   
  
A. Corporate Control Variables 
 
CONCENTRATION              -0.919     -0.730                
                                              (0.433)    (0.381)               
Mean              -0.689       -1.752                        -0.557       -1.230 
[Standard Deviation]              [0.158]      [0.295]                 [0.191]      [0.340] 
Minimum              -0.931       -2.207                  -0.916       -1.780 
Maximum                -0.390       -1.132                  -0.193       -0.515 
 
DIVIDENDS                           0.122              
                                               (0.248)                                  
 
ICOVERAGE                          0.022    
                                              (1.080)                       
 
B. Conditioning Variables 
 
Constant                                 -0.856     -1.806  
                                              (1.514)    (0.425)  
 
FIXED                                   -0.189    
                                              (0.880)     
 
GROWTH                               4.102      
                                              (4.353)                                
 
MARKET/BOOK                    0.433      0.428  
                                              (0.196)    (0.158)  
 
PROFITABILITY                  -0.150              
                                              (0.179)               
 
SIZE                                      -0.206   
                                              (0.188)    
 
VOLATILITY                       -1.121     
                                              (0.996)      
 
Adjusted R
2                            0.103       0.092    
RSS                                        8.407      9.253    
Θ                                            0.008      0.112     
∆+                                         -0.146      -0.131    
                                             [0.195]    [0.187]  
∆−                                            0.166       0.147    
           [0.090]     [0.094]  
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probability of bank affiliation.  We assess this impact by the change in a firm's 
probability of being bank influenced when its CONCENTRATION variable 
changes.  These changes are represented by ∆+, when CONCENTRATION 
changes from 0 to 1 for an unconcentrated firm, and ∆-, when CONCENTRATION 
changes from 1 to 0 for a concentrated firm.
21  In column 1, the entry for ∆+ 
indicates that the probability of bank affiliation for the unconcentrated firms is 
initially 0.195 (the number in braces) and this probability falls sharply by -0.146 
when CONCENTRATION is changed from 0 to 1.  The entry for ∆- indicates that 
the sensitivity is approximately symmetric; for those firms who initially have 
concentrated ownership, the probability of bank affiliation rises by 0.166 when 
CONCENTRATION is changed from 1 to 0.    
  Our empirical results suggesting that bank influence is a substitute control 
mechanism may be challenged because of the substantial cross-shareholdings by 
non-financial corporations.  Consider a situation where Firm A has a substantial 
ownership interest in Firm B, and Firm A has a widely-dispersed ownership.  In 
our dataset, Firm B would be classified as concentrated, even though its ultimate 
ownership is dispersed.  In reviewing the work of Schreyogg and Steinmann 
(1981), Edwards and Fischer (1994, p. 189) conclude "...that the importance of 
non-financial enterprises as shareholders in Germany means that care is required 
when shareownership data are used to draw inferences about the significance of 
corporate control problems in Germany."    Fortunately, our dataset permits us to 
control for the effect of cross-shareholdings by non-financial corporations.  We 
remove those firms for which a national enterprise holds a) more than 25% of the 
outstanding shares and no other owner holds more than 25% or b) more than 50% 
of the outstanding shares (i.e., those national enterprises holding a majority or 
plurality (in excess of 25%) of the outstanding shares).  This exclusion reduces the 
                         
21 See the notes to Table 4 for details about the computation of ∆+ and ∆− .     
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number of observations from 91 to 58.   
  The EVA with the reduced samples is presented in columns 5 and 6 of 
Table 4, and offers a dramatic confirmation of the corporate control hypothesis.  
The mean of the distributions falls (in absolute value) from -0.689 to -0.557.  As 
expected given the reduction in sample size, standard deviations rise.  The 
distributions of t-statistics are shifted toward zero with the smaller samples.  Most 
importantly, removing the effect of cross-shareholdings has no impact on the 
general conclusion to be drawn from the probit estimates -- it is impossible to 
obtain anything other than a negative sign for any of the CONCENTRATION 
coefficients and these coefficients are frequently far from zero in a statistical 
sense. 
  In sum, our results point toward the interpretation that the control problems 
posed by the corporate form of organization are addressed by concentrated 
ownership or bank influence. 
 
5.  The Profitability Hypothesis       
5.1.  Testable Implications 
  The GBIM holds that there exists unique benefits associated with a bank 
relation.  Lower charges for external finance and limits on managerial 
opportunism will enable firms, ceteris paribus, to earn greater profits.  The 
profitability hypothesis is examined in terms of the following OLS specification,  
 
 PROFITABILITY  =   Φ[BI : Z
P]  +  ε,        ( 4 )  
                                          + 
where PROFITABILITY is return on assets, equal to net income (after pension 
payments but before taxes) and interest expense both divided by TOTALASSETS.  
The conditioning variables represented by Z
P are the same as Z
F with the inclusion 
of LEVERAGE and the exclusion of PROFITABILITY and DIVIDENDS.   
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LEVERAGE is included to capture a positive risk premia impounded in 
PROFITABILITY, and DIVIDENDS is excluded because, with relatively constant 
dividend payout ratios, PROFITABILITY and DIVIDENDS move very closely 
together.  The impact of bank influence on PROFITABILITY is assessed by the 
coefficient on BI.   
  This implication is based on several auxiliary assumptions that have not 
received attention in the literature.  For firms in a competitive industry, a favorable 
shift in the long-run cost curve (due to an attenuation of finance and control 
problems) would increase the scale of operation but have no long-run impact on 
profitability.  Thus, it is possible for the GBIM's finance and control channels to 
positively impact firms, but their effects may remain undetectable by profitability 
equations.  To generate the prediction of a positive coefficient on BI in (4), we 
need to impose an auxiliary assumption about noncompetitive product or factor 
markets or other impediments permitting a sustained level of economic profits  
  Independent of favorable financing and control outcomes and a 
noncompetitive market structure, firm profitability can be negatively related to 
bank influence for three very different reasons (which are not mutually exclusive).  
First, the information advantage enjoyed by banks may permit them to exploit 
firms with which they are associated through excessive charges for borrowed 
funds or fees for a variety of services, such as underwriting securities, conducting 
trust and fiduciary businesses, and facilitating financial market transactions 
(Baums, 1993; Wenger, 1992).  Second, bank influence and firm profitability can 
be negatively associated because of a selection effect.  Firms encountering 
financial difficulties may become affiliated with banks, and the relative 
profitability of bank influenced firms will be lower.  Rather than pointing toward a 
deleterious role, this negative profitability effect may actually highlight a  
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significant value of bank affiliation.
22  Third, instead of guarding shareholders' 
interests, banks may in fact protect management from shareholders by their 
positions on the supervisory board and accumulation of voting rights.  Policies 
followed by such protected management would deviate from the profit-
maximizing optimum.  
  To summarize the above discussion, the GBIM in isolation does not have 
clear implications for the relation between firm profitability and bank influence 
(4), which can be consistent with the following economic environments: 
 
   Positive Relation:    Valid GBIM and noncompetitive markets;  
 
   Negative Relation:    Firm exploitation, adverse selection,  
               or management protection;  
 
   No Relation:      Valid GBIM and competitive markets,  
               or invalid GBIM. 
Although the profitability test is somewhat ambiguous, a negative relation clearly 
rejects the GBIM.  
5.2.  Empirical Results 
  The relation between profitability and bank influence is examined in Table 
5.  The PROFITABILITY regressions in columns 1 and 2 indicate significant 
relations with MARKET/BOOK and LEVERAGE.  For BI, the coefficients are 
negative and statistically significant at the 10% level in column 1 but not in 
column 2.  When BI is interacted with the conditioning variables, the results in 
column 2 are statistically significant (Ω = 0.073) but economically unimportant (Γ 
= -0.036).  Bank influence is negatively related to PROFITABILITY but, on 
balance, this relation is not statistically or economically significant.   This 
                         
22
 Seger (1997, Table 56) finds no evidence that bank influence is positively associated with 
poorly performing companies.  
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Table 5:  Ordinary Least Squares Regressions -- Dependent Variable: PROFITABILITY 
 
 
For all but the last two rows, the entries are based on the following Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression model (4):  PROFITABILITY = Φ[BI : Z
P] + ε.  Φ[.] is a linear function, ε is a 
stochastic error, and Z
P represents the set of conditioning variables listed in Panel B.  Column 1 
uses the full set of conditioning variables; column 2 uses those conditioning variables significant 
at the 10% level in the initial regression.  Column 5 uses the full set of conditioning variables 
except for CONCENTRATION.  Column 6 uses the full set of conditioning variables, but 
excludes BI.  All variables are described in Table 1.  Estimated coefficients are reported in the 
table; standard errors are in parentheses and are heteroscedastic consistent using the technique of 
White (1980) with a bias correction (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993, pp. 552-554, equation 
HC2).  RSS is the residual sum of squares.  The remaining two entries are based on the following 
OLS regression model that permits both the constant term and slope coefficients to differ for 
bank influenced firms:  PROFITABILITY = Φ[BI*Z
P: Z
P] + ε.  Ω is the p-value for the F-
statistic testing the null hypothesis that the interaction variables, BI*Z
P, have no effect on 
PROFITABILITY.  This statistic is distributed F(K,N-2K), where K is the number of 
conditioning variables (including the constant term).  Γ is the percentage change in 
PROFITABILITY with respect to an increase in BI.  For firms having BI=0, BI is changed from 
0 to 1, and the fitted values of PROFITABILITY are computed; for firms having BI=1, BI is 
changed from 1 to 0, the fitted values of PROFITABILITY are computed, and are multiplied by  
-1.  Γ equals the mean of the ratio of these fitted values divided by PROFITABILITY.  Ω and Γ 
measure the statistical and economic importance, respectively, of the interaction variables.  
Columns 3 and 4 contain the Extreme Value Analysis (EVA) using all possible combinations of 
the conditioning variables.   Column 3 contains the mean, standard deviation, lower bound, and 
upper bound of the distribution of the estimated BI coefficient.  Column 4 contains the same 




Table 5 (continued):  Ordinary Least Squares Regressions -- Dependent Variable: 





     _________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                                                                    EVA               .                 
                                                                                     Coefficients  T-Statistics 
     Variable                                  (1)            (2)          (3)             (4)                      (5)          (6)      .   
 
 
A. Bank Influence Variable 
 
BI                                        -0.677      -0.607       -0.612   
                                            (0.392)    (0.403)       (0.402) 
        
Mean        -0.312      -0.802   
[Standard Deviation]        [0.249]     [0.631] 
Minimum        -0.756      -1.873 




B. Conditioning Variables 
 
Constant                                8.868      9.094       8.880       8.700 
                                            (1.045)    (0.834)                   (1.046)    (1.116)  
 
CONCENTRATION            -0.252                      -0.172 
                                            (0.218)                                                               (0.223) 
 
FIXED                                 -0.305         -0.360     -0.302 
                                            (0.297)     (0.292)    (0.305) 
      
GROWTH                             0.877      0.859       0.405 
                                            (2.613)                (2.677)    (2.781) 
      
LEVERAGE                        -8.101     -7.753         -8.312     -7.877 
                                            (1.096)    (1.083)                 (1.091)    (1.139)  
 
MARKET/BOOK                 0.444       0.410       0.419      0.381 
                                           (0.222)      (0.213)      (0.224)    (0.214) 
 
SIZE                                     0.163           0.182       0.185 
                                           (0.121)         (0.117)    (0.129) 
 
VOLATILITY                      0.277         0.297       0.361 
                                           (0.421)         (0.401)    (0.410) 
 
Adjusted R
2                         0.398      0.390       0.397      0.380 
RSS                                   93.200     100.10                  94.390   97.180 
Ω                                         0.333      0.073       0.316      0.834 
Γ                                          0.053     -0.036           0.011     -0.053    
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conclusion is supported by the EVAs in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5.  Negative 
coefficients predominate, and statistical and economic significance are usually 
absent for BI.  Bank influence is negatively related to profitability in some cases, 
but the relation appears fragile.  More definitively, there is no evidence supporting  
the GBIM's positive profitability effect.   
  The probit results in Section 4 suggest that bank influence and concentrated 
ownership are substitute control mechanisms.  This substitutability implies that 
these two control variables should have similar effects on profitability.  Column 1 
confirms this implication; both BI and CONCENTRATION are negative but 
imprecisely estimated.  Further information can be obtained by reestimating 
equation 4 (presented in column 1) with only BI or CONCENTRATION included 
as a regressor along with the other conditioning variables.  These results are 
presented in columns 5 and 6, and confirm that bank influence and ownership 
concentration have negative but statistically insignificant effects on profitability.  
  These results for ownership concentration are related to the recent and 
important work on legal structures and corporate governance developed in a series 
of papers by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny.
23  In their 
framework, ownership concentration may enhance performance by reducing the 
managerial agency costs that arise with the separation of management and finance.  
These costs are particularly likely to occur in Germany with its relatively weak 
legal protections of equity investors.  However, it is also recognized that the 
private benefits of control may also rise with concentrated ownership to the 
detriment of firm performance.  The results in Table 5 suggest either that 
ownership concentration does not convey the above benefit and cost or that they 
                         
23 See La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
and references therein. 
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approximately cancel.   
 6.  Summary and Conclusions 
  This study has examined the German Bank Influence Model (GBIM) with a 
unique dataset and a focus on the fragility/sturdiness of inferences.  Three 
implications of the GBIM have been assessed.   
  First, do bank influenced firms enjoy lower finance costs?  German banks 
allegedly supply finance relatively cheaply because of their technical expertise and 
superior information.  In addition to this direct finance channel, we also examined 
a certification channel that may lower finance costs indirectly.  Our results 
suggested that finance costs are not lower for firms affiliated with banks. 
  Second, is bank influence a solution to control problems?  By combining 
superior information and consolidated power, banks are allegedly well-positioned 
to consult, monitor or discipline management.  A sizeable equity stake may create 
substantial incentives to exercise corporate control.  Bank influence and 
concentrated ownership were negatively related, which suggested that they are 
substitute means for controlling corporations.   
  Third, do bank influenced firms enjoy higher profitability?  The favorable 
financing and control outcomes associated with the GBIM implies a favorable 
shift in the long-run cost curve and an increase in profitability provided the firms 
operate in noncompetitive markets.  This hypothesis is not supported in the current 
study.  In contrast to Cable (1985), Gorton and Schmid (2000), and Lehmann and 
Weigand (2000), we do not find a significant positive relation between bank 
influence and profitability.   
  Our empirical results do not lend much support to the GBIM and, while 
deep structural links have not been uncovered, they permit us to draw a 
preliminary sketch of an alternative model of the German system of corporate 
control (though additional interpretations are possible).  Control dilemmas are  
  35
omnipresent, and firm owners address this problem by choosing a concentrated 
ownership structure or a bank affiliation (Table 4).
24  Banks must be compensated 
for the resources employed in creating value for their client firms.  Such 
compensation can take the form of fees for various services or charges for 
borrowed funds that are above market levels.  The empirical results in Table 2 
indicate that bank affiliated firms do not hold greater amounts of bank debt, and 
these weakly negative relations are compatible with the following scenario:  the 
firm participates in a loan market substantially controlled by its primary bank, the 
bank offers its profit-maximizing price of debt, and bank affiliated firms respond 
by borrowing less than independent firms facing lower loan rates.  Relatively 
expensive bank interest charges and service fees survive in equilibrium because of 
the compensating benefits from the resolution of control problems enhancing 
economic performance.  On balance, there is no net effect on profitability relative 
to independent firms (Table 5) as the benefits of control are counterbalanced by 
the inflated costs of banking services.
25  This equilibrium is sustainable provided 
banks continue to be effective monitors, a role questioned recently because of 
several prominent failures of corporate control.  
  The results presented in this study and the above sketch of the German 
system of finance and control suggests several directions for future research.  
Demsetz and Lehn (1985, United States) and Prowse (1992, Japan) have shown 
that ownership patterns respond to the economic incentives for control.  Our 
finding on corporate control substitutability raises the further question as to which 
                         
24 This conclusion is consistent the evidence in Kaplan (1994), who finds that, for German firms, 
the relation between management board turnover and firm performance is independent of bank 
affiliation.  He concludes that "...one plausible explanation is that all firms are subject to similar 
monitoring technologies" (p. 144).   
25 A similar conclusion about bank-firm relations in Japan is reached by Weinstein and Yafeh 
(1998).   
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policy and non-policy factors determine the type of control mechanism used in 
Germany.   
  An additional issue is the purported role played by banks assisting firms in 
financial distress.  This important function has been documented by Hoshi, 
Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990) in Japan.  Whether German banks function in a 
similar supportive manner remains an important open question, especially since 
active support of financially distressed firms would impact the interpretation of the 
bank-profitability relation.  Further examination of these issues should yield a 
deeper understanding of the structural characteristics of the German economy and 
the general nature of finance and governance mechanisms.   
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Appendix:  List Of The 91 German Firms Drawn From The Bonn Database 
  The number in column 1 is the firm's identifier in this list.  The number in 
column 2 is the firm's identifier in the Bonn Database.    
1  2  AKZO FASER AG       
2  540   ALEXANDERWERK AG REMSCHEID       
3  541    ALLWEILER AG        
4  522    AMIRA VERWALTUNGS AG       
5  145   ANDREAE- NORIS ZAHN AG       
6  68   AUDI AG       
7  542   BADENWERK AG       
8  28   BALCKE-DUERR AG       
9  7   BASF AG       
10  32    BAYER AG       
11  12   BAYERISCHE MOTORENWERKE AG       
12  10   BEIERSDORF AG       
13  549   BERLINER KINDL BRAUEREI AG       
14  122   BILFINGER + BERGER BAUAKTIENGESELLSCHAFT       
15  555   BRAUEREI CLUSS       
16  558   BRAUNSCHWEIGISCHE MASCHINENBAUANSTALT       
17  120   BREMER VULKAN AG       
18  561   BREMER WOLL- KAEMMEREI AG       
19 17 CASELLA  AG 
20  22    CONTINENTAL GUMMI-WERKE AG       
21  132   DEUTSCHE SPEZIALGLAS AG       
22  26   DEUTSCHE TELEPHONWERKE UND KABELINDUSTRIE AG 
23  127   DIDIER - WERKE AG       
24  574   DORTMUNDER ACTIEN BRAUEREI AG       
25  52   DORTMUNDER RITTERBRAUEREI AG  
26  107   DYCKERHOFF AG       
27  324   ELSFLETHER WERFT AG       
28  547   ENERGIEVERSORGUNG OBERFRANKEN AG       
29  581   ENERGIEVERSORGUNG OSTBAYERN AG       
30  584   ERLUS BAUSTOFFWERKE AG       
31  585   ERSTE KULMBACHER ACTIEN BRAUEREI AG       
32  36  FORD-WERKE AG       
33  587   FRAENKISCHES UEBERLANDWERK AG       
34  39   GEHE AG       
35   41   GOLDSCHMIDT, TH. AG       
36  160   GRUENZWEIG + HARTMANN UND GLASFASER AG       
37  42   GUANO-WERKE AG       
38  46   HAGEDA AG       
39  130   HARTMANN & BRAUN AG       
40  5  HASEN-BRAEU AG       
41  152   HEIDELBERGER ZEMENT AG       
42  166   HEIN, LEHMANN AG       
43  48   HILGERS AG       
44  97   HOCHTIEF AG        
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45  33    HOECHST AG       
46  598   HOFBRAUHAUS WOLTERS AG       
47  49    HOLSTEN BRAUEREI AG             
48  140   HUTSCHENREUTHER AG       
49  600   ISAR- AMPERWERKE AG       
50  551   KARSTADT AG       
51  254   KEMPINSKI AG       
52  147   KERAMAG KERAMISCHE WERKE AG       
53  20    KLOECKNER-HUMBOLDT-DEUTZ AG       
54  128   KOLB & SCHUELE AG       
55  169   KRAUSS-MAFFEI AG       
56  125   KSB KLEIN, SCHANZLIN & BECKER AG       
57  258   KUEHLHAUS ZENTRUM AG       
58  277   KULMBACHER REICHELBRAEU AG       
59  259   KUPFERBERG, CHR., ADALBERT + CO. KGAA       
60  58   LECH ELEKTRIZITAETSWERKE AG       
61  171   LEONISCHE DRAHTWERKE AG       
62  69    LINDE AG       
63  262   MAIN - KRAFTWERKE AG       
64  40   MARKT- UND KUEHLHALLEN AG       
65  179   MASCHINENFABRIK MUELLER-WEINGARTEN AG       
66  268   MITTELSCHWAEBISCHE UEBERLANDZENTRALE AG       
67  182   MUEHLE RUENINGEN AG       
68  344   NECKARWERKE ELEKTRIZITAETSVERSORGUNGS- AG       
69  153   NORDCEMENT AG       
70  126   O & K ORENSTEIN & KOPPEL AG       
71  71   PARKBRAUEREI AG PIRMASENS-ZWEIBRUECKEN       
72  501   PFERSEE KOLBERMOOR AG       
73  102   PHOENIX AG       
74  280   RHENAG RHEINISCHE ENERGIE AG       
75  19   RIETER INGOLSTADT SPINNEREIMASCHINENBAU AG       
76  63   SALAMANDER AG       
77  284   SEKTKELLEREI SCHLOSS WACHENHEIM AG       
78  90   SPINNSTOFF FABRIK ZEHLENDORF AG       
79  92    SUED-CHEMIE AG       
80  105   TUCHER BRAEU AG       
81  511   UEBERLANDWERK UNTERFRANKEN AG       
82  513   UNIVERSITAETSDRUCKEREI H. STUERTZ AG             
83  65   VEREINIGTE DEUTSCHE NICKELWERKE AG       
84  525   VEREINIGTE ELEKTRIZITAETSWERKE WESTFALEN AG        
85  96   VEREINIGTE FILZFABRIKEN GIENGEN AG       
86  517   VGT AG       
87  296   WESTAG & GETALIT AG       
88  527   WILKENS BREMER SILBERWAREN AG       
89  143   WMF WUERTTEMBERGISCHE METALLWARENFABRIK AG      
90  529   WOLLDECKENFABRIK WEIL DER STADT AG             
91  531   ZEAG  ZEMENTWERK LAUFFEN - ELEKTRIZITAETSWERK HEILBRONN AG  
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